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KULKS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
RULE 7. PLEADINGS ALLOWED; MO-
TIONS, MEMORANDA, HEARINGS, OR-
DERS, OBJECTION TO COMMISSION-
ER'S ORDER 
(a) Pleadings. There shall be a complaint and an 
answer; a reply to a counterclaim; an answer to a 
cross-claim, if the answer contains a cross-claim; a 
third-party complaint, if a person who was not an 
original party is summoned under the provisions of 
Rule 14; and a third-party answer, if a third-party 
complaint is seized. No other pleading shall be 
allowed, except that the court may order a reply to an 
answer or a third-party answer. 
(b) Motions. An application to the court for an 
order shall be by motion which, unless made during a 
hearing or trial or in proceedings before a court 
commissioner, shall be made in accordance with this 
rule. A motion shall be in writing and state succinctly 
and with particularity the relief sought and the 
grounds for the relief sought. 
(c) Memoranda. 
(c)(1) Me mom it da retptired. exceptions, filing 
(tines. All motions, except uncontested or ex parte 
motions, shall be accompanied by a supporting memo-
randum. Within ten days after service of the motion 
and supporting memorandum, a party opposing the 
motion shall tile a memorandum in opposition. Within 
five days after service of the memorandum in opposi-
tion, the moving party may tile a reply memorandum, 
which shall be limited to rebuttal of matters raised in 
the memorandum in opposition. No other memoranda 
will be considered without leave of court. A party may 
attach a proposed order to its initial memorandum. 
(c)(2) Length. Initial memoranda shall not exceed 
10 pages of argument without leave of the court. Reply 
memoranda shall not exceed 5 pages of argument 
without leave of the court. The court may permit a 
party to file an over-length memorandum upon ex 
parte application and a showing of good cause. 
(c)(3) Content. 
(c)(3)(A) A memorandum supporting a motion for 
summary judgment shall contain a statement of mate-
rial facts as to which the moving party contends no 
genuine issue exists. Each fact shall be separately 
stated and numbered and supported by citation to 
relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery 
materials. Each fact set forth in the moving party's 
memorandum is deemed admitted for the purpose of 
summary judgment unless controverted by the re-
sponding party. 
(c)(3)(B) A memorandum opposing a motion for 
summary judgment shall contain a verbatim restate-
ment of each of the moving party's facts that is 
controverted, and may contain a separate statement of 
additional facts in dispute. For each of the moving 
party's facts that is controverted, the opposing party 
shall provide an explanation of the grounds for any 
dispute, supported by citation to relevant materials, 
such as affidavits or discovery materials. For any 
additional facts set forth in the opposing memorandum, 
each fact shall be separately stated and numbered and 
supported by citation to supporting materials, such as 
affidavits or discovery materials. 
(c)(3)(C) A memorandum with more than 10 pages of 
argument shall contain a table of contents and a table 
of authorities with page references. 
(c)(3)(D) A party may attach as exhibits to a memo-
randum relevant portions of documents cited in the 
memorandum, such as affidavits or discovery materi-
als. 
(d) Request to submit for decision. When brief-
ing is complete, either party may file a "Request to 
Submit for Decision." The request to submit for 
decision shall state the date on which the motion was 
served, the date the opposing memorandum, if any, was 
served, the date the reply memorandum, if any, was 
served, and whether a hearing has been requested. If 
no party files a request, the motion will not hi* 
submitted for decision. 
(e) Hearings. The court may hold a hearing on any 
motion. A party may request a hearing in the motion, 
in a memorandum or in the request to submit for 
decision. A request for hearing shall be separately 
identified in the caption of the document containing the 
request. The court shall grant a request for a hearing 
on a motion under Rule 56 or a motion that would 
dispose of the action or any claim or defense in the 
action unless the court finds that the motion or 
opposition to the motion is frivolous or the issue has 
been authoritatively decided, 
(f) Orders. 
(f)(1) An order includes every direction of the court, 
including a minute order entered in writing, not 
included in a judgment. An order for the payment of 
money may be enforced in the same manner as if it 
were a judgment. Except as otherwise provided by 
these rules, any order made without notice to the 
adverse party may be vacated or modified by the judge 
who made it with or without notice. Orders shall state 
whether they are entered upon trial, stipulation, mo-
tion or the court's initiative. 
(f)(2) Unless the court approves the proposed order 
submitted with an initial memorandum, or unless 
otherwise directed by the court, the prevailing party 
shall, within fifteen days after the court's decision, 
sei-ve upon the other parties a proposed order in 
conformity with the court's decision. Objections to the 
proposed order shall be filed within five days after 
service. The party preparing the order shall file the 
proposed order upon being served with an objection or 
upon expiration of the time to object. 
(g) Objection to court commissioner's recom-
mendation. A recommendation of a court commis-
sioner is the order of the court until modified by the 
court. A party may object to the recommendation by 
filing an objection in the same manner as C\\\ng
 a 
motion within ten days after the recommendation is 
made in open court or, if the court commissioner takes 
the matter under advisement, ten clays after the 
minute entry of the recommendation is served. A 
party may respond to the objection in the same manner 
as responding to a motion. 
RULE 8. GENERAL RULES 
OF PLEADINGS 
(a) Claims for Relief. A pleading' which sets forth 
a claim for relief, whether an original claim, counter-
claim, cross-claim or third-party claim, shall contain (1) 
a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 
the pleader is entitled to relief; and (2) a demand for 
judgment for the relief to which he deems himself 
entitled. Relief in the alternative1 or of several differ-
ent types may he demanded. 
(b) Defenses; Form of Denials. A party shall 
state in short and plain terms his defenses to each 
claim asseited and shall admit or deny the averments 
upon which the adverse party relies. If he is without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as 
to the truth of an averment, he shall so state and this 
has the effect of a denial. Denials shall fairly meet the 
substance of the averments denied. When a pleader 
intends in good faith to deny only a part or a 
qualification of an averment, he shall specify so much of 
it as is true and material and shall deny only the 
i'emainder. Unless the pleader intends in good faith to 
controvert all the averments of the preceding pleading, 
he may make his denials as specific denials of designat-
ed averments or paragraphs, or he may generally deny 
all the averments except such designated averments or 
paragraphs as he expressly admits; but, when he does 
so intend to controvert all its averments, he may do so 
by general denial subject to the obligations set forth in 
Rule 11. 
(c) Affirmative Defenses. In pleading to a preced-
ing pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively 
accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, assump-
tion of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in 
bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure of consideration, 
fraud, illegality, injury by fellow sen-ant, laches, li-
cense, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, 
statute of limitations, waiver, and any other matter 
constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense. 
When a party has mistakenly designated a defense as a 
counterclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, the court 
on terms, if justice so requires, shall treat the plead-
ings as if there had been a proper designation. 
(d) Effect of Failure to Deny. Averments in a 
pleading to which a responsive pleading is required, 
other than those.as to the amount of damage, are 
admitted when not denied in the responsive pleading. 
Averments in a pleading to which no responsive 
pleading is required or permitted shall be taken as 
denied or avoided. 
(e) Pleading to He Concise and Direct; Consis-
tency. 
(1) Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, 
concise, and direct. No technical forms of pleading or 
motions are required. 
(2) A party may set forth two or more statements of 
a claim or defense alternately or hypothetic-ally, either 
in one count or defense or in separate counts or 
defenses. When two or more statements are made in 
the alternative and one of them if made independently 
would be sufficient, the pleading is not made insuffi-
cient by the insufficiency of one ov more of the 
alternative statements. A party may also state as 
many separate claims or defenses as he has regardless 
of consistency and whether based on legal or on 
equitable grounds or on both. All statements shall be 
made subject to the obligations set forth in Ride 11. 
(f) Construction of Pleadings. All pleadings shall 
be so construed as to do substantial justice. 
R U L E 12. D E F E N S E S AND O B J E C T I O N S 
(a) When presented. Unless otherwise provided by 
statute or order of the court, a defendant shall serve an 
answer within twenty days after the senice of the 
summons and complaint is complete within the state 
and within thirty days after sen'ice of the summons 
and complaint is complete outside the state. A party 
sei-ved with a pleading stating a cross-claim shall serve1 
an answer thereto within twenty days after the service. 
The plaintiff shall serve a reply to a counterclaim in the 
answer within twenty days after sen'ice of the answer 
or, if a reply is ordered by the court, within twenty 
days after sen'ice of the order, unless the order 
othenvise directs. The senice of a motion under this 
rule alters these periods of time as follows, unless a 
different time is fixed by order of the court, but a 
motion directed to fewer than all of the claims in a 
pleading does not affect the time for responding to the 
remaining claims: 
(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its 
disposition until the trial on the merits, the responsive 
pleading shall be served within ten days after notice of 
the court's action; 
(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite 
statement, the responsive pleading shall be served 
within ten days after the senice of the more definite 
statement. 
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to 
claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, 
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be 
asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is 
required, except that the following defenses may at the 
option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of 
jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdic-
tion over the person, (:]) improper venue, (4) insuffi-
ciency of process, (o) insufficiency of service of process. 
('(>) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted, (7) failure to join an indispensable party. A 
motion making any of these defenses shall lie made 
before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. So 
defense or objection is waived by being joined with one 
or more other defenses or objections in a responsive 
pleading or motion or by further pleading after the 
denial of such motion or objection. If a pleading sets 
forth a claim for relief to which the adverse parly is not 
required to ser\cj a responsive pleading, the adverse 
party may assert at the trial any defense in law or lad 
to that claim for relief. If. on a motion asserting the 
defense numbered (<>) to dismiss for failure of the 
pleading to state4 a claim upon which relief can he 
granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to 
and not excluded by the court, the motion shall he 
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of 
as provided in Utile ~>b\ and all parties shall he given 
reasonable opportunity to present all material made 
pertinent to such a motion by Rule •">(;. 
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After 
the pleadings are closed hut within such time as not t<> 
delay the trial, any party may move for judgment <>n 
the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the 
pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented 
to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall he 
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of 
as provided in Rule •"><">, and all parties shall he given 
reasonable opportunity to present all material made 
pertinent to such a motion by Rule f>(i. 
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically 
enumerated (l)-(7) in subdivision (b) of this ride, 
whether made in a pleading or by motion, and the 
motion for judgment mentioned in subdivision (c) of 
this rule shall be hoard and determined before trial on 
application of any party, unless the court orders that 
the hearings and determination thereof be delerrerl 
until the trial. 
(e) Motion for more definite statement. I f a 
pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted is 
so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably 
be required to frame a responsive pleading, the party 
may move for a more definite statement before inter-
posing a responsive pleading. The motion shall point 
out the defects complained of and the details desired. If 
the motion is granted and the order of the* court is not 
obeyed within ten days after notice of the order <>r 
within such other time as the court may fix, the court 
may strike the pleading to which the motion was 
directed or make such order as if deems just. 
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party 
before responding to a pleading or, if no responsive 
pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion made 
by a party within twenty days after the service of the 
pleading, the court may order stricken from any 
pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, 
immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter. 
•(g) Consolidation of defenses. A parly who makes 
a motion under this rule may join with it the other 
motions herein provided for and then available. If a 
party makes a motion under this rule and does not 
include therein all flefenses and objections then avail-
able which this rule permits to be raised by motion. lh<' 
pally shall not thereafter make a motion based on any 
of the defenses or objections so omitted, except as 
provided in subdivision (h) of this rule. 
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses 
and objections not presented either by motion or by 
answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the 
defense of failure to join an indispensable party, and 
the objection of failure to state a legal defense to a 
claim may also be made by a later pleading, if one is 
permitted, or by motion for judgment on the pleadings 
or at the trial on the merits, and except (2) that, 
whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or 
otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the 
subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action. The 
objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall be 
disposed of as provided in Rule 15(b) in the light of any 
evidence that may have been received. 
(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of 
a responsive pleading after the denial of any motion 
made pursuant to these rules shall not be deemed a 
waiver of such motion. 
(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. 
When the plaintiff in an action resides out of this state, 
or is a foreign corporation, the defendant may file a 
motion to require the plaintiff to furnish security for 
costs and charges which may be awarded against such 
plaintiff. Upon hearing and determination by the court 
of the reasonable necessity therefor, the court shall 
order the plaintiff to file a $300.00 undertaking with 
sufficient sureties as security for payment of such costs 
and charges as may be awarded against such plaintiff. 
No security shall be required of any officer, instrumen-
tality, or agency of the United States. 
(k) Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the 
plaintiff fails to file the undertaking as ordered within 
30 days of the service of the order, the court shall, upon 
motion of the defendant, enter an order dismissing the 
action. 
RULE 15. AMENDED AND 
SUPPLEMENTAL 
PLEADINGS 
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading 
once as a matter of course at any time before a 
responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one 
to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the 
action has not been placed upon the trial calendar, he 
may so amend it at any time within 20 days after it is 
served. Othei-wise a party may amend his pleading 
only by leave of court or by written consent of the 
adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when 
justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to 
an amended pleading within the time remaining for 
response to the original pleading or within 10 days 
after service of the amended pleading, whichever 
period may be the longer, unless the court otherwise 
orders. 
(b) Amendments to Conform to the Evidence. 
When issues not raised by the pleading are tried by 
express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be 
treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the 
pleadings. Such amendments of the pleadings as may 
be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence 
and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of 
any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure 
so to amend does not affect the result of the trial of 
these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on 
the ground that it is not within the issues made by the 
pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be 
amended when the presentation of the merits of the 
action will be subserved thereby and the objecting 
party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of 
such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his 
action or defense upon the merits. The court shall 
grant a continuance, if necessary, to enable the object-
ing party to meet such evidence. 
(c) Relation Back of Amendments. Whenever the 
claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading 
arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set 
forth or attempted to be set forth in the original 
pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of 
the original pleading. 
(d) Supplemental Pleadings. Upon motion of a 
party the court may, upon reasonable notice and upon 
such terms as are just, permit him to serve a supple-
mental pleading setting forth transactions or occur-
rences or events which have happened since the date of 
the pleading sought .to be supplemented. Permission 
may be granted even though the original pleading is 
defective in its statement of a claim for relief or 
defense. If the court deems it advisable that the 
adverse party plead to the supplemental pleading, it 
shall so order, specifying the time therefor. 
RULE 19. JOINDER OF PERSONS 
NEEDED FOR JUST 
ADJUDICATION 
(a) Persons to He Joined if Feasible. A person 
who is subject to service of process and whose joinder 
will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the 
subject matter of action shall be joined as a party in the 
action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be 
accorded among those already parties, or (2) he claims 
an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so 
situated that the disposition of the action in his absence 
may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his 
ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the 
persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of 
incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent 
obligations by reason of his claimed interest. If he has 
not been so joined, the court shall order that he be 
made a party. If he should join as a plaintiff but 
refuses to do so, he may be made a defendant, or, in a 
propei* case, an involuntary plaintiff. If the joined 
party objects to venue and his joinder would render the 
venue of the action improper, he shall be dismissed 
from the action. 
(b) Determination by Court Whenever Joinder 
Not Feasible. If a person as described in Subdivision 
(a)(l)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court 
shall determine whether in equity and good conscience 
the action should proceed among the parties before it, 
or should be dismissed, the absent person being thus 
regarded as indispensable. The factors to be consid-
ered by the court include: first, to what extent a 
judgment rendered in the person's absence might be 
prejudicial to him or those already parties; second, the 
extent to which, by protective provisions in the judg-
ment, by the shaping of relief, or other measure, the 
prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a 
judgment rendered in the person's absence will be 
adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an 
adequate remedv if the action is dismissed for nonjoin-
der. 
(c) I'leading Reasons for Nonjoinder, A pleading 
asserting a claim for relief shall state the names, if 
known to the pleader, of any persons as described in 
Subdivision (a)(l)-(2) hereof who are not joined, and 
the reasons why they are not joined. 
(d) Exception of Class Actions. This rule is 
subject to the provisions of Rule 23. 
JefferyR.Price(6315) 
Christopher C. Hill (9583) 
BOSTWICK & PRICE, P.C. 
One Thirty Nine East 
South Temple St., Suite 320 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)961-7400 
Facsimile: (801) 961-7406 
Attorneys for Defendants Slone & Veralynn Porter 
IN lill< HHIIM'II DISTRICT COURT, STATE Ol LI Ail 
IN AND F OR WASATCH COI JNTY 
TRACY and KERIN COWLEY, DKKKNDAINTS1 TKIAI, HKIKI' 
Plaintiffs, 
Civil No, 030500244 
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Defendants. 
Defendants Slone and \ L....>;,.. l . . ; - . . \ •» *" •'••- K * * • • \ IM-MCE, 
)'i . Iicn'hv siihn -* iue loliuwiijg brief in suppuil ol llieir position a- ina! beginning June l,2oo4. 
Statement of the Case 
- • ' a.v: e-: A, > .- ' ? .!iut^  i - im; meetings and conversations wlrich 
occurred by and among the Plainutts and Defendants between June 22, 2002 and July 19, 2002, Those 
meetings and conversations concerned the dissolnln »n ol Advanced Maintenance Servu cs, \w 
r'AMS'Y a I flah ( 'oiporalion, tl le distribution of assets from AM'S as between Slone Porter and Tracy 
'"' ""'
 U
~
M
' " ' "
 w 1 i l ,r f
'
 v?
 '
 m n r , t
'
n n
 nftho business n-ialion:,;,!;) netween Slone I 'OHL' ••.* 
Tracy Cowley. 
[lie Complaint is a total of three (3) pat'ev and contains only nine (0) paragraphs r.; lacm.a 
allegations and one cause of action ibi ,.iii...... i •< n ' nanuzraph ui the 
n unipki'ii' no" dispuini I"1*, 'h1 Hofendants, is paragraph 1 stating that the parties are each residents of 
Wasatch County, Utah. 
Paragraph i, ;aaLiu, • . : • • • . ' •. . - te are owners of 50% of the stock of AMS, 
and Paraj'.iaph v ^hrnm that Delendanls at> husband and wile aic owners of 50% of the ,^ h.,,k .-: - •. i9 
are false. Slone Porter and Tracy Cowley were each 50V o <>w nei »»i AMS HnmfitfKn m ("owleyand 
Deiendaiil Vaalynii IViifei wen never shareholders of AMS, and are not. individually, party to any 
written agreement pertaining to AMS, its dissolution or the distribution ot a^ct., .:_> .aid between 1 ntc\ 
Cowley and Slone Porter . • •• • . oiis lawsuit; Kerin Cowley because 
s'no :- . •-' standing as a Plaintiff in this ease, a1 id Veralvnn Pom a because she had no ownership interest 
in any of the assets which are at issue in i u ;*;o ,.;,:-.. . » : . : - . . . . * • •* ..*•-. «: 
individual agreenienl. 
Paragraph -1 of the Complaint is false. Following extensive discoveiy. m :.;•. i . o<-
ol UIL i*;<iiui,i:s< UK I*.!.-. • • •* •• t! ; --* a- agreement readied by and between Slone 
Porter and Tracy Cowley as early as June 24, 2002 concerning the dissolution of AMS and the 
distribution of it-: assets and the cessnfio-j . : ;.:.;. eusmov..
 ii:. .-, - * • : • • : ,ser t that the 
agr<^!- f ; !- a itii lg. [lie Court, having denied Plaintiffs Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, 
and thrice denying Plaintiffs' various motioiis for summary judgment, has determined -a. . 
undisputed that Slonr I'oiiei and ! ncy i 'owlev fvadinl an agreement under which AMS was to be 
dissolved, and the assets distributed by and In (\v< vn Ihc shwrhnUvTs, along with other assets not held in 
lilt* iiiiiiK!" of AMS perse. 
Paragraph 5 of the Complaint is falsi.:. \\ \ > uiuiispuu r. if. Slum: JI • "' * •'* *• >'•" i u iorm a 
new I lt;ih < Vt - • .-. ailed Qualify Mai •<- ^ ce Systems, inc. ("QMS"). There is no evidence that 
they simply transferred the business of AMS to their new company. As of June 2002, the \ inly t uslni I H I 
nf <\M? was 7-Elcvcn. SIK. Because o MC illicii loiiii.'itioii >iiid npeiatinn n.| AMS in violation of the 
C ^ • - ' • • • '' i *- 7-Eleven, Inc. fired AM'S and Tracy Cowley from doing any further 
work fin 7-Eleven, hie " !-iue2-i ?H0? 7 Eleven, Inc. then re estaDiibi:.. i • «.t.i i* • • ; ' 
and Veralynn Poilci in linn new company, only \hi (Is own purposes in keeping continuity of the service 
work performed by the group of technicians whom 7-Eleven, Inc. needed to maintain its stores. 
Following the decision of 7-hlcvcn, Inc. to diseonlinuc liny Imlli i u,niL M'HII AMS Ihc p irties met, 
dr * us d ; f M M 1 •<! .i^eement pertaining to the dissolution of AMS and the distribution of its assets 
between Slone Porter and Tracy Cowley. That agreement was rea.ch.ed orally o.. \ "< .• 
not reduced In a wi ilniy signed In I u r v ("owicv ,iinf Slonr Porter. 
As stated by the Court, pre oniiv before the court loi tri. ! ,nx essentially two issue0,' t I) u liether 
the agreement between the parties call :* . : . P • - »» > • - * in the total 
*!• • • • ' ^ Mf ),000 or 5600,000 paid in monthly instalments over five years for Tracy Cowley's portion 
ni \\\r • apital assets of AMS; and (?.) whether there has been :..i.h,.icnt pan pen* iin \u- .: « 
\nj\s . - iii -i .i!'u-. •-. . ' • • ' - . '*pj •• : urcments of the Statute of Frauds, so that the 
agreement is legally enforceable and binding.1 
There appears to be no dispute concerning the other terms of the agreement, or that they have all 
been completely performed. They included such things as Slone Porter being responsible for all of the 
AMS debt; the payment of 50% of the cash on hand and the accounts receivable of AMS to Tracy 
Cowley; transfer of 100% of the business of Straight Line Striping, Inc. to Mr. Cowley; transfer of his 
choice of two properties purchased with funds of AMS; transfer of Mr. Cowley's vehicle from AMS to 
him and payment of the outstanding balance of the loan on the truck; transfer of other vehicles to Mr. 
Cowley; transfer of his IRA; transfer of key man life insurance policy; continuing payment of insurance 
benefits for Mr. Cowley and his family; etc. 
On the one hand, Defendants contend that the parties agreed that Cowleys would accept payment 
of $240,000 for Tracy Cowley's portion of the AMS capital assets, to be paid in monthly instalments of 
$4,000.00 over five years beginning in August 2002. The Porters have paid the Cowleys $4,000.00 per 
month, every month since August 2002 in accordance with that Agreement and are not in breach of the 
parties Agreement as of the date of the trial. Each of those payments has been received, accepted and 
negotiated by the Cowleys. 
The Plaintiffs contend, on the other hand, that Tracy Cowley accepted an initial offer from Slone 
Porter to pay to Tracy Cowley $600,000 for Tracy Cowley's portion of the capital assets of AMS, to be 
paid in monthly instalments of $10,000.00 over five years beginning in August 2002, and that the 
By stipulation of the parties and order of the Court, the issues of whether to order 
judicial dissolution, and the attendant valuation of the business of AMS have been bifurcated and 
reserved for trial later, if, and only if the court determines the agreement of the parties is not 
enforceable by reason of the Statute of Frauds. 
payment of $4,000.00 is nothing but a subsistence stipend of some sort, for which Slone Porter is not 
entitled to a credit against the $600,000.00. There is no admissible evidence to support the Plaintiffs' 
contention that Tracy Cowley and Slone Porter reached an Agreement, oral or in writing, for payment of 
the $600,000.00. Both the conduct and direct testimony of the Plaintiffs contradict their newly contrived 
theory of recovery in this case. 
The overwhelming weight of the competent, relevant and admissible evidence is that because of 
the termination of AMS by 7-Eleven, Inc. stemming from the violation of the customer's CBC by Tracy 
Cowley and Slone Porter, and the customer's insistence that Tracy Cowley could have no business with 
7-Eleven, Inc. through AMS or otherwise, and that AMS contracts were to be re-bid and QMS would 
have to establish itself as a new vendor, Tracy Cowley and Slone Porter reached an agreement on July 
19, 2002, for payment of the $240,000, based upon Tracy Cowley's own inventory and valuation of the 
capital assets of AMS. The agreement of the parties was always premised upon the ability of Slone 
Porter to maintain work and obtain revenue from the customer, 7-Eleven, Inc. 
Thereafter, the parties proceeded according to their agreement until Tracy Cowley has sought to 
obtain more money from the Porters by threat of disclosure of private facts, and this litigation. Because 
of the violation of the CBC by Slone and Tracy Cowley, and directly and proximately because of Tracy 
Cowley's attempt through this lawsuit to continue to profit from the violation, the customer, 7-Eleven, 
Inc. has completely terminated its relationship with QMS and Slone and Veralynn Porter, so that there is 
no more business after May 31, 2004. 
Under the circumstances of this case, Plaintiffs are entitled to no recovery or relief under the 
Complaint. First, Veralynn Porter is not an appropriate defendant under the circumstances of this case. 
Second, there has been no breach of the parties' Agreement by Slone Porter. The Court has no authority 
at law to issue a judgment against Slone Porter or any defendant based upon concerns about a potential 
future breach of contract. Finally, this action and the resulting loss of Slone Porter's business with 7-
Eleven, Inc. were directly and proximately caused by Tracy Cowley, such that he is estopped from 
recovery of any damages from Slone Porter under the doctrines of failure to mitigate damages, waiver, 
estoppel, and unclean hands. 
ARGUMENT 
I. CORPORATE DISSOLUTION 
The Cowleys' Complaint alleges that Advanced Maintenance Services, Inc. ("AMS) was 
improperly dissolved. There are three different procedures by which a corporation may be dissolved 
under the Utah Revised Business Corporation Act. They are: (1) voluntarily dissolution under § 16- 10a-
1401 et seq., (2) administrative dissolution under §16-10a-1420 and 1421; and (3) judicial dissolution 
under §16-10a-1430 and 1431. The claim for Judicial Dissolution is moot, and reserved for trial later 
only upon the court's determination in this bifurcated proceeding that the parties reached an oral 
agreement which is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds. 
II. CONTRACT 
"In order to support a contract there must be an offer and an acceptance, together with a 
consideration." Kirk v. United States, 451 F.2d 690, 692 (10th Cir. 1971). The offer and acceptance 
elements of contract formation constitute mutual assent. In order for an agreement to be enforced, there 
must be mutual assent. "cIt is fundamental that a meeting of the minds on the integral features of an 
agreement is essential to the formation of a contract. An agreement cannot be enforced if its terms are 
indefinite.'" Nielsen v. Gold's Gym, 78 P.3d 600, 602 (Utah 2003) (quoting Richard Barton Enters, v. 
Tsern, 928 P.2d 368, 373 (Utah 1996) (citations omitted)). Any agreement which was entered into 
between two parties must contain all of the material terms of the agreement. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has stated that: 
"It is not necessary that the contract itself contain all the particulars of the agreement. 
The crucial question is whether the parties agreed on the essential terms of the contract." 
Stated another way, a contract does not exist without a "meeting of the minds" or "mutual 
assent." Regarding this requirement, "the intentions of the parties to a contract are 
controlling, and generally those intentions will be found in the instrument itself. 
However, if a writing is not sufficient to establish meaning, resort may be had to 
extraneous evidence manifesting the intentions of the parties." 
C&Y Corp. v. General Biometrics, Inc., 896 P.2d 47, 52 (Utah Ct. App. (1995) (citations omitted)). 
In this case, there was never an agreement for payment of $10,000.00 per month to the Cowleys. 
There was never mutual assent to such an agreement. This was offered \o the Cowleys, but never 
accepted. Tracy Cowley returned his copy of the written offer without signing it to the Porters with a 
notation on it for Ms. Porter to call him. She did call him and they discussed additional terms he wanted 
in the contract. These additional terms constitute a counteroffer by the Cowleys. "So long as there is 
any uncertainty or indefmiteness, or future negotiations or considerations to be had between the parties, 
there is not a completed contract. In fact, there is no contract at all." 67 Utah 605, 608 (Utah 1926). 
"' A reply to an offer, though purporting to accept it, which adds qualifications or requires 
performance of conditions is not an acceptance but is a counter-offer.'" Wadsworth Const, v. City of St. 
George, 865 P.2d 1373, 1376 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quoting R.J. Damn Const, v. Child, 247 P.2d 817, 
821 (Utah 1952)). The response by Mr. Cowley contacting the Porters and discussing additional terms 
constitutes a counteroffer. 
u0n the other hand, a response is an acceptance where the offeree manifests 'unconditional 
agreement to all of the terms of the offer.' The offeree must 'manifest a definite intention to accept the 
offer and every part thereof. . . without material reservations or conditions." Id. (quoting R.J. Daum 
Co«^.,247P.2dat819). 
It is clear that there was never a meeting of the minds between the Cowleys and the Porters in 
this matter on the $10,000.00 per month payment. The Cowleys came back to the Porters to discuss 
additional terms which constitute a counteroffer. This counteroffer was never accepted by the Porters. 
There was no meeting of the minds between the parties on a contract for $10,000.00 per month for five 
years. 
III. BREACH OF CONTRACT 
Utah law is clear on what is necessary to prove a breach of contract claim. "The elements of a 
prima facie case for breach of contract are (1) a contract, (2) performance by the party seeking recovery, 
(3) breach of the contract by the other party, and (4) damages." Campbell, Maack & Sessions v. Debry, 
38 P.2d 984, 991 (Utah Ct. App. 2001) (quoting Bair v. Axiom Design, L.L.C., 2001 UT 20, f 14). 
In the present case, the Cowleys cannot prove that a breach of a contract has occurred. A 
contract did exist, and the Porters have adhered to that contract since the split between the Porters and 
the Cowleys happened. The Cowleys have argued that the terms of the contract are different than the 
terms the Porters have adhered to. This issue as to what the terms of the contract are is to be determined 
at this trial. 
The Cowleys did in fact turn over all of the assets of AMS to the Porters, and the Porters, in turn, 
did perform all terms of the contract agreed to. The Cowleys cannot prove that the Porters have 
breached any contract because they have not. The Cowleys' counsel in open court admitted that the 
Porters have not been delinquent or missed any payment to the Cowleys. There has been no breach of 
the agreement. The Cowleys have not suffered any damages because there has been no breach by the 
Porters. 
The Cowleys cannot prove their claim for breach of contract because the Porters have met all of 
the terms and conditions of the contract, there has been no breach of the contract, and the Cowleys have 
not suffered any damages as a result of any breach because there has been none. 
IV. STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
The Statute of Frauds is generally found at Utah Code Ann. §25-5-1, et seq., and requires certain 
types of agreement to be executed in writing. The Statute includes agreements regarding interests in real 
estate, as well as agreements which cannot be performed within one year. Utah Code Ann. §25-5-1, 4(1) 
The Utah Supreme Court has long established that "the doctrine of part performance allows a 
court of equity to enforce an oral agreement, if it has been partially performed, notwithstanding the 
statute of frauds." Spears v. Warr, 44 P.3d 742, 751 (Utah 2002) (citing Martin v. Scholl, 678 P.2d 274, 
275 (Utah 1983)). 
The Utah Supreme Court in Spears, concerning the standard for determining sufficient partial 
performance, stated in pertinent part: 
The standard for sufficient partial performance in Utah is as follows: 
[1] the oral contract and its terms must be clear and definite; [2] the acts done in 
performance of the contract must be equally clear and definite; and [3] the acts must be in 
reliance on the contract. Such acts in reliance must be such that (a) they would not have 
been performed had the contract not existed, and (b) the failure to perform on the part of 
the promisor would result in fraud on the performer who relied, since damages would be 
inadequate. Reliance may be made in innumerable ways, all of which could refer 
exclusively to the contract 
Id. (quoting Martin v. Scholl, 678 P.2d 274, 275 (Utah 1983)). 
Acts of part performance must be exclusively referable to the contract in that the 
possession of the party seeking specific performance and the improvements made by him 
must be reasonably explicable only on the postulate that a contract exists. The reason for 
such requirement is that the equitable doctrine of part performance is based on estoppel 
and unless the acts of part performance are exclusively referable to the contract, there is 
nothing to show that the plaintiff relied on it or changed his position to his prejudice. 
Id. at 751 (quoting Martin v. Scholl, 678 P.2d 274, 277 (Utah 1983)). 
In another cases decided by the Utah Supreme Court, the Court discussed the part performance 
exception to the statute of frauds. The Court stated: 
As we have held with regard to the statute of frauds: 
'The critical observation to make in [assessing] what constitutes sufficient 
part performance is that it must be proved by strong evidence. Whether 
phrased in "reliance" terminology where the evidentiary measurement is a 
substantial changed in position or worded in "performance" language where 
the measurement is whether the acts appear to be a result of the contract, or 
whether they are explainable on another ground, the strong, acts-oriented 
evidentiary standard is constant." Martin v. Scholl, 678 P.2d 274, 275 
(Utah 1983); see also 2 Corbin on Contracts, § 425 (1950). Merely 
preparatory acts,.. .do not constitute part performance. See e.g., Baugh v. 
Logan City, 495 P.2d 814, 817 (Utah 1972). 
Jenkins v. Percival, 962 P.2d 796, 801-02 (Utah 1998). 
By the overwhelming weight of the evidence in this case, from both the conduct of the parties, the 
documentation relating to the facts and circumstances of the parties' discussions, and the testimony of the 
witnesses, including the Plaintiffs, there was no agreement concerning payment of the $600,000.00. 
There was a completed oral agreement for payment of the $240,000.00, together with the distribution of 
the other assets and consideration of Slone Porter being responsible for the debt of AMS. There can be 
no genuine dispute that sufficient part performance has occurred to bring the parties' agreement squarely 
within the exception to the Statute of Frauds and is legally binding and enforceable. There has been no 
breach of the Agreement by Slone Porter. Under these circumstances judgment should be for the 
Defendants, and the Complaint dismissed in its entirety, with prejudice. 
V. MITIGATION 
The Cowleys' claims are barred by reason that Tracy Cowley has failed to mitigate any damages 
he alleges he has incurred relating to the parties' agreement. Concerning the Plaintiffs' requirement to 
mitigate damages, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
"Damages awarded for breach of contract should 'place the nonbreaching party in as good 
a position as if the contract had been performed.'" Anesthesiologists Assoc, v. St. 
Benedicts Hosp., 884 P.2d 1236, 1238 (Utah 1994) (quoting Alexander v. Brown, 646 P.2d 
692, 695 (Utah 1982)). However, under the doctrine of avoidable consequences the 
nonbreaching party has an active duty to mitigate his damages, and he "may not, either by 
action or inaction, aggravate the injury occasioned by the breach." Utah Farm Prod. 
Credit Ass 'n v. Cox, 627 P.2d 62, 64 (Utah 1981); Angelos v. First Interstate Bank, 611 
P.2d 772, 777 (Utah 1983); see also Anesthesiologists Assoc v. St. Benedicts Hosp., 852 
P.2d 1030, 1039 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); John CallEng'g v. Manti City, 795 P.2d 678, 680 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 350 (1981). 
Mahmood v. Ross, 990 P.2d 933, 940 (Utah 1999). 
The Utah Court of Appeals has described mitigation in the following way: 
In an action for damages for breach of contract, the amount of damages otherwise recoverable by 
plaintiff can be reduced if plaintiff succeeded in mitigating its damages or if it failed to properly 
mitigate its damages. "The doctrine of of avoidable consequences, also referred to as mitigation 
of damages, generally operates to prevent ono against whom a wrong has been committed from 
recovering any item of damage arising from the wrongful conduct which could have been avoided 
or minimized by reasonable means." Angelos v. First Interstate Bank, 671 P.2d 772, 777 (Utah 
1983). However, the burden of proving plaintiff has not mitigated its damages and that its award 
should be correspondingly reduced is on defendant. "The plaintiff has the burden of showing the 
contract breach and his damages, while, as a rule the defendant has the burden of proving that 
damages shown could have been minimized." D. Dobbs, Remedies § 12.6, at 830 (1973). 
In order to submit the issue [of mitigation] to the jury, there must be competent evidence to show 
that the plaintiff failed to take reasonable efforts to mitigate his damages." Barnes v. Lopez, 544 
P.2d 694, 698 (Ariz. App. 1976). 
John CallEng'g v. Manti City, 795 P.2d 678, 680 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
In the present case, the Cowleys have done nothing to mitigate their damages, if any. On the 
contrary, they, by their actions in this lawsuit and in choosing to violate the 7-Eleven, Inc. CBC have 
directly and proximately caused the circumstances which may impair their ability to obtain any further 
payment under the parties' agreement such that their claim is barred as a matter of law. They have 
continued to harass the Porters in their business efforts, and have continued such techniques to the point 
that the Porters' sole customer, 7-Eleven, Inc., for their new business, QMS, has terminated all contracts 
with QMS because of the Cowleys. The Cowleys cannot and should not now be heard to complain that 
they are still owed money based on the valuation of a business which was destroyed by their own actions. 
VI. WAIVER 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated what is necessary for the doctrine of waiver to apply. The 
Court stated; "With respect to the doctrine of waiver, this Court has stated: 'To constitute waiver, one's 
action or conduct must be distinctly made, must evince in some unequivocal manner an intent to waive, 
and must be inconsistent with any other intent.'" Angelos v. First Interstate Bank, 671 P.2d 772, 776-77 
(Utah 1983) (quoting Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P.2d 430, 432 (Utah 1983)). 
In this case, the Cowleys have waived any claim that they may have for $10,000.00 per month by 
their actions. The Porters have paid the Cowleys $4,000.00 per month for twenty-two months with the 
Cowleys accepting each and every payment. There was never any agreement to pay $10,000.00 per 
month and this is evidenced by the conduct of both parties. There can be no other reason for the 
acceptance of the $4,000.00 per month payments other than that is what was agreed to by both parties. 
Twenty-two (22) months of payments and acceptance certainly cannot be interpreted to be "temporary 
subsistence" payments. 
VII. ESTOPPEL 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated what is necessary for the doctrine of estoppel to apply. The 
Court stated: 
The doctrine of estoppel has application when one, by his acts, representations, or conduct, 
or by his silence when he ought to speak, induces another to believe certain facts exist and 
such other relies thereon to his detriment. 
Angelos v. First Interstate Bank, 671 P.2d 772, 777 (Utah 1983) (quoting Leaver v. Grose, 610 P.2d 
1262, 1264 (Utah 1980)). 
The Court further stated that "the purpose of the doctrine of estoppel is 'to rescue from loss a 
party who has, without fault, been deluded into a course of action by the wrong or neglect of another.'" 
Id. (quoting Rowley v. Marrcrest Homeowners' Association 656 P.2d 414, 418 (Utah 1982)). 
In a separate case, the Utah Supreme Court set out the elements necessary to bring the doctrine of 
estoppel into play. The Court stated: 
The elements essential to invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel are: 
(1) an admission, statement, or act inconsistent with the claim afterwards asserted, 
(2) action by the other party on the faith of such admission, statement, or act, and 
(3) injury to such other party resulting from allowing the first party to contradict or 
repudiate such admission, statement, or act. 
Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control, 602 P.2d 689 (Utah 1979). 
In this case, the Cowleys have made admissions, statements, and/or acts inconsistent with their 
claims, specifically, they have been accepting $4,000.00 payments every month from the Porters for 
nearly two years. This is inconsistent from their claim that they are owed $10,000.00 per month. The 
Porters have acted in good faith in reliance on the agreement with the Cowleys for $4,000.00 per month 
and the fact the Cowleys have been accepting this amount for twenty-two (22) months. The Porters have 
suffered devastating financial loss stemming from the loss of the their business, caused by the Cowleys 
actions and conduct. Under the doctrine of estoppel, the Cowleys' claims are barred such that the Court 
should enter judgment for the Defendants excusing any further performance under the Agreement, and to 
dismiss the Complaint in its entirety, with prejudice. 
VIII. UNCLEAN HANDS 
"The equitable doctrine of clean hands expresses the principle that where a party comes into 
equity for relief he or she must show that his or her conduct has been fair, equitable, and honest as to the 
particular controversy in issue. A complainant will not be permitted to take advantage of his or her own 
wrong or claim the benefit of his or her own fraud or that of his or her privies." 27A Am. Jur. 2d Equity 
§ 126 (2003). The U.S. Supreme Court has stated regarding unclean hands, "the 'unclean hands' doctrine 
'closes the door of a court of equity to one tainted with inequitableness or bad faith relative to the matter 
in which he seeks relief, however improper may have been the behavior of the defendant."' ABF Freight 
System, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 510 U.S. 317, 329-30 (1994) (quoting Precision 
Instrument Mfg. co. v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814 (1945)). 
One of the fundamental principles found in equity is that '"he who seeks equity must come into 
the court with clean hands.'" Hocker v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 922 F. 2d 1476, 1486 (10th Cir. 1991) 
(quoting Lewis v. State Bd. of Control, 699 P.2d 822, 827 (Wyo. 1985)). It does not matter if both parties 
come to court with unclean hands, the "defendant holds the stronger ground." Bruner v. Bruner, 338 F.3d 
1172, 1178 (10th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). "The clean-hands doctrine bars Plaintiffs claims 
notwithstanding the fact that those who stand to benefit from the doctrine's use, . . . , also participated in 
the alleged fraud." Id. 
In this case the Cowleys come into this case with unclean hands. Mr. Cowley was violating the 7-
Eleven CBC the entire time AMS was in business. This violation of the CBC, as well as this litigation 
has caused QMS to be terminated by 7-Eleven, all because of the unclean hands of the Cowleys. Under 
the doctrine of unclean hands, the Cowleys' claims are barred such that the Court should enter judgment 
for the Defendants excusing any further performance under the Agreement, and to dismiss the Complaint 
in its entirety, with prejudice. 
CONCLUSION 
In view of the facts and arguments set forth above, and in light of the evidence adduced at the 
trial, Defendants Slone and Veralynn Porter request that the Court issue and Order and Judgment in their 
favor and against Plaintiffs Tracy and Kerin Cowley, to excuse Slone Porter from any further 
performance by way of payment to the Cowleys, and to dismiss the Complaint in its entirety, with 
prejudice, and to award to Defendants all further relief the Court deems just and appropriate under the 
circumstances. 
DATED this day of May, 2004. 
BOSTWICK & PRICE, P.C 
Jeffery R. Price 
Christopher C. Hill 
Attorneys for Defendants Slone & Veralynn Porter 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this ^ ^ c l a y of May, 2004,1 caused to be served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing TRIAL BRIEF upon counsel for Plaintiffs by hand delivery to the following: 
E. Craig Smay 
Attorney at Law 
174 E. South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
4TH DISTRICT COURT - HEBER COURT 
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TRACY COWLEY Et al, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SLONE PORTER Et al, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
TELEPHONIC ORAL ARGUMENTS 
Case No: 030500244 CN 
Judge: DONALD J. EYRE 
Date: January 2, 2004 
Clerk: diannb 
TELEPHONE CONFERENCE 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): E CRAIG SMAY 
Defendant's Attorney(s): JEFFERY R PRICE 
Audio 
HEARING 
This is the time set for oral arguments handled telephonically as 
to pending motions on file. 
Mr. Price addressed the Court and argued as to Motion in Limine 
first and then argued as to the pending Motion for Protective 
Order. 
Response by Mr. Smay as to both the motions. 
Mr. Smay is questioned by the Court. 
Reply by Mr. Price, requesting the Court bifurcate the issue and 
set the -matter for a two-day trial to determine if there was an 
agreement or not and if so was enforceable. 
No objection by Mr. Smay, granted by the Court. 
Court will extend discovery to February 1, 2004 and will set the 
matter for trial as a 2nd place setting on June 14-15, 2004 and as 
a 1st place setting on October 4-5, 2004. 
Relevent discovery argued by counsel. 
Court will order that defendant's submit requested discovery from 
July 1, 2004 thru January 1, 2003 to plaintiff. 
Mr. Price to submit an appropriate order and submit it to the 
Court for signature and filing. 
Case No: 030500244 
Date: Jan 02, 2004 
2ND PLACE BENCH TRIAL is scheduled. 
Date: 06/14/2004 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: COURTROOM 1 
WASATCH COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
13 61 SOUTH HIGHWAY 40 
HEBER, UT 84032 
Before Judge: DONALD J. EYRE 
2ND PLACE BENCH TRIAL. 
Date: 06/15/2004 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: COURTROOM 1 
WASATCH COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
1361 SOUTH HIGHWAY 40 
HEBER, UT 84032 
Before Judge: DONALD J. EYRE 
1ST PLACE BENCH TRIAL. 
Date: 10/04/2004 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: COURTROOM 1 
WASATCH COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
1361 SOUTH HIGHWAY 40 
HEBER, UT 84032 
Before Judge: DONALD J. EYRE 
1ST PLACE BENCH TRIAL. 
Date: 10/05/2004 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: COURTROOM 1 
WASATCH COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
1361 SOUTH HIGHWAY 4 0 
HEBER, UT 84032 
Before Judge: DONALD J. EYRE 
D a a o O f l a o h l 
( J ^ O C H . - ? PH 2: 18 
JefferyR. Price (6315) 
Christopher C.Hill (9583) 
BOSTWICK & PRICE, P.C. 
One Thirty Nine East 
South Temple St., Suite 320 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 961-7400 
Facsimile: (801) 961-7406 
Attorneys for Defendants Slone & Veralynn Porter 
m THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
m AND FOR WASATCH COUNTY 
TRACY COWLEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SLONE PORTER, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 030500244 
Judge Donald Eyre, Jr. 
This matter having come before the Court during the trial on June 1 and June 2, 2004 in this 
matter, and based upon Defendant's Counsel's oral motion dismiss both Plaintiff, Kerin Cowley and 
Defendant, Veralynn Porter as parties in this lawsuit, the Court having heard oral argument from both 
parties and having reviewed the pleadings on file now rules as follows: 
Plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff, Kerin Cowley and Defendant, Veralynn Porter as Parties 
is hereby granted. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Court will grant the oral 
motion argued by both parties and will dismiss Kerin Cowley, plaintiff and Veralynn Porter, defendant 
as parties to this lawsuit 
DATED this ? f day of. j. 2004. 
OURT 
3ge Donalq 
Judge 
Approved as to form: 
E. Craig Smay 
Attorney for Defendant (s) 
I hereby certify that on this 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
c 7 - > o a y of June, 2004,1 caused to be served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Order upon counsel for Plaintiffs via U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid to the following: 
E. Craig Smay 
Attorney at Law 
174 E. South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
E. Craig Smay #2985 
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFFS 
174 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone Number (801) 539-8515 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TRACY and KERIN COWLEY 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
SLONE and VERALYNN PORTER 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF KERIN COWLEY 
abfiwwy 
Case Number:.©©?955?^4 
Judge Donald J. Eyre 
Kerin Cowley, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am the Kerin Cowley who appeared and testified as a plaintiff herein. 
2. October 4, 2004, I attended a meeting at the office of E. Craig Smay and heard the 
testimony, under oath, of Slone Porter regarding payment of the Judgment in this matter. 
3. Mr. Porter testified in my presence as follows: 
a. He has not paid any part of, and has no plan to pay, the Judgment: 
b. Prior to the trial herein, he conveyed his half-interest in Quality Maintenance 
Services ("QMS") to Vera Lynn Porter, the owner of the other half, for $1.00; 
c. He in fact testified at trial herein that he is an "owner" of TruGreen Land Care of 
Utah, ("TLCU") but is now merely a forty hour per week, $250/week employee of TLCU; he is not 
1 
KT> 
22 
now an owner of TLCU; 
d. TLCU is a franchise, which was purchased with proceeds of a Zion's Bank loan 
in the original principal amount of $609,000 made in February 2004, and that such loan also 
provides a continuing line of credit for operations of TLCU. 
e. Mr. Porter is the obligor on such Zion's Bank Loan; if there are other obligors; 
Mr. Porter cannot identify them; 
f. Mr. Porter cannot identify who purchased TLCU with the proceeds of the Zion's 
Bank loan on which Mr. Porter is obligor; 
g. One of the services Mr. Porter provides TLCU for his salary of + $6.25/hr. is to 
provide it his contractor's license as a basis for its operations; 
h. When the Court, shortly prior to trial herein, lifted an attachment of real estate 
belonging to Mr. Porter and his wife, the properties were immediately sold, for $254,000 and 
$110,000 respectively, and the proceeds paid to retire said Zion's Bank Loan; 
i. No assets of QMS were transferred to TLCU; Mr. Porter does not know what 
disposition was made of the assets of QMS; 
J. Mr. Porter's "supervisor" at TLCU is Brian Curtis; and 
k. Mr. Porter has no other interest of any kind in any business entity. 
4. I took careful notes of the questions asked Mr. Porter, and the answers he gave and have 
reviewed them carefully in making this affidavit, and the foregoing is a true and correct account of 
his testimony. 
5. I am personally aware of the delivery of assets of QMS to TLCU, as my husband, Tracy 
Cowley and I, shortly before the trial herein, observed the majority of the vehicles belonging to 
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QMS, and so identified by painted logos, parked in the equipment lot of TLCU, and photographed 
them there. 
6. Following the trial herein, my husband and I have received no payment of any kind from 
Mr. Porter or QMS. 
Further Affiant sayeth not. 
DATED this V -day of October, 2004. 
MC 
Kerin Cowley 
sZiiSst: \ • #$ *£& GPP W CHRISTENSEN 
Notary Public 
^ ^ State of Utah 
VjiS^
 M y Commission Expires July 31 2007 
P 0 Box 38. 5 South Mam. Hebet City. UT 84032 
.County of y u * * ^ - ^ 
State ot J^J^ ' icsfaoX 
Subsctibedands^ntobetoremeonii=^ 
(Notary&Snature) 
: ippW€hristensen 
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E. Craig Smay #2985 
174 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone Number (801) 539-8515 
Fax Number (801) 539-8544 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, WASATCH COUNTY 
Tracy and Kerin COWLEY, 
PLAINTIFFS' POST TRIAL MEMO 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
Case Number: 030500244 
Slone and Veralynn PORTER. 
Judge: Donald Eyre, Jr. 
Defendants. 
PlaintifFs submit herewith their Post-Trial Memorandum, accompanying proposed Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
DISPOSITION AFTER TRIAL 
The Court may well wonder at this point why plaintiffs have bothered to put on evidence of 
a $600,000 buy-out of plaintiff s half of Advanced Maintenance Services, Inc. ("AMS"). Certainly, 
based upon even the scant financial evidence in the matter, a half-interest in AMS as of June 22, 2002 
was worth vastly more than $600,000 over five years without interest. Moreover, there has never 
been a serious prospect in this case that defendants could show an agreement to accept $4,000/month 
for five years, or that any such "agreement" was "partially performed" sufficiently to satisfy the 
Statute of Frauds, or that any such "agreement" was adequately supported by consideration, or not 
vitiated by fraud or duress. Plaintiffs' interests were served by persisting in a claim for judicial 
dissolution. 
The reason, however self-congratulatory it might sound, is that the Court is entitled to the 
truth, and plaintiffs under an obligation to provide it. Once discovery placed the pertinent evidence 
in plaintiffs' hands, the only proper course was to put it into proper context for the Court. Further, 
of course, unless all of the available evidence is treated truthfully and in context, the result can only 
be dishonest and misleading, as pointedly demonstrated in this matter by the first Affidavit of Slone 
Porter. 
Finally, that plaintiffs have fully explicated the facts, and that the facts may show a contract 
to sell their interest in AMS for $600,000, does not bind them now to affirm such a contract, and 
forego a judicial dissolution. Any such agreement may have been procured by defendants' breach of 
a duty of good faith and fair dealing. Moreover, where a contract has been repeatedly and 
deliberately breached despite repeated requests for compliance, it may be cancelled, and return of the 
subject matter demanded. Polyglycoat Corp. v. Holcomb, 591 P.2d 449 (Utah 1979). As defendants 
now assert that they have despoiled the subject matter, and lost its value, the corollary rule is that 
they must pay its value (as of June 22, 2002). This is not affected by a claim that there can be no 
judicial dissolution because AMS has already been dissolved: the only "dissolution" in evidence is the 
void one filed July 21, 2002, which defendants claim to have based upon a non-existent agreement 
of July 19, 2002. In short, the real agreement of the parties to dissolve AMS being shown, it is also 
shown that defendants' behavior constituted fraud and duress, and has constituted continuing, 
material breach. Plaintiffs may now opt to rescind such agreement, and insist upon a judicial 
valuation and dissolution. 
Where defendants force plaintiffs to a trial demonstrating both such contract and its deliberate, 
long-term breach, they should not expect that plaintiffs will affirm the contract as they might have 
done had defendants behaved honestly. Defendants' disavowal of plaintiffs' affirmance of such 
contract on summary judgment frees plaintiff to assert rescission now. 
ALTERNATIVE BASES FOR DECISION 
There are a number of possible alternative bases for decision in this matter as follows: 
1. A contract for $600,000 which the parties agreed was made at least orally, and written and 
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signed by at least Slone Porter, on June 24, 2002; 
2. A contract for $600,000 on June 24, 2002, because the signing by Porter of Cowley's 
written counteroffer created a contract without Cowley's signature. 
3. A contract for $600,000 completed by June 29, 2002, because Cowieys' full performance 
by that date substituted for his signature. 
4. A contract for $600,000 demonstrated by "part performance" referable only to that 
agreement. 
5. An alleged July 19, 2002, $240,000 "contract" after the fact, as to which there is no 
undisputed evidence of agreement. 
6. A claim that such $240,000 "contract" was "partially performed" for purposes of the 
Statute of Frauds by three subsequently disputed payments. 
7. Unenforceability of such alleged $240,000 contract because the consideration to support 
it and the inducement to plaintiffs to enter into it, claimed sudden decline in the value of the subject 
matter, was false and fraudulent. 
8. Unenforceability of such $240,000 "contract" because it was extorted under duress by the 
breach of a covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
9. Non-existence of either a $600,000 contract or a $240,000 contract, necessitating a 
judicial dissolution. 
10. Non-existence of a $240,000 contract and rescission of a $600,000 contract as procured 
by fraud or duress or for repeated breach, necessitating a judicial dissolution. 
Since the many prospects contain only one which could benefit defendants, it is appropriate 
to deal with that first. Defendants can succeed only if the Court were to find, by clear and convincing 
evidence producing a strong conviction, that plaintiffs on July 19, 2002, voluntarily and informedly 
agreed to accept $4,000/month for five years for their half of AMS, and that there then transpired 
substantial acts in compliance with such agreement which can only be explained by the existence of 
such a contract. (Cites) 
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It is essential to defendants' case to demonstrate that what Mr. Porter accurately described 
as "our buy-out agreement" of June 24, 2002, was effectively withdrawn before July 19, 2002. 
Otherwise, all of the acts of "performance" which defendants have cited as "part performance" of 
a July 19th contract are referable instead to "our buy-out agreement" of June 24, 2002. That would 
doom any claim of "strict referability" to the alleged agreement of July 19, 2002. Mr. Porter now 
asserts what Mrs. Porter and Mr. Cowley deny, and which was omitted from his encyclopedic 
affidavits: that on June 26, 2002, Porter unilaterally withdrew "our buy-out agreement" of June 24, 
2002. 
If the document signed by Porter the morning of June 24,2002, satisfies the Statute of Frauds, 
or if the signature constituted acceptance of a counter-offer creating a contract, nothing Porter now 
claims to have said on June 26,2002, could withdraw or condition the agreement. Nothing said later 
on July 19, 2002, could withdraw or condition the prior agreement. S.C.M. Land Co. v. Watkins & 
Faber, 732 P.2d 105, 108 (Utah 1986). 
Supposing that the signed writing of June 24th does not satisfy the Statute of Frauds, Porter's 
testimony about June 26th is as incredible as it is ineffective to avoid a claim of part performance of 
the June 24th agreement. 
The June 26th story, omitted from Porter's encyclopedia affidavit of September 29, 2003, 
contradicts the testimony of Mrs. Porter and Mr. Cowley that nothing happened between June 24th 
and July 19th to alter the agreement, as well as the testimony of both Porters and Mr. Cowley that on 
June 27, 2002, all three told Mr. de Besche of 7-Eleven that a deal had been concluded to buy out 
Mr. Cowley's interest. That discussion, according to the notes made at the time, included the Porters 
discussing the terms with de Besche in such a way that he must actually have seen the document,1 but 
1
 Mr. Cowley is said to have sought a change in "number 9". This remark signifies 
nothing unless de Besche had the document before him and could see that the ninth item, which is 
otherwise un-numbered, is the "no non-compete clause", and not one of the other numbered 
provisions. The reference to withdrawing the offer on "Monday" is clearly to June 24th -
whereupon, they put "everything in the paper" to make an agreement. By its terms, it does not 
refer to June 26th. 
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contains no claim that on the preceding Wednesday the agreement had been withdrawn. 
The story about June 26th, which Mr. Porter "could not wait" to tell, is simply an eleventh 
hour fabrication to plug a growing hole in defendants' position. Even if believed, it fails because 
Porter then testified that on June 26, 2002 the Cowleys "exploded" and rejected any change. 
Thereafter, Cowleys folly performed and Porters partially performed, all without objection. Porter's 
acceptance of Cowley's performance knowing of Cowleys' reliance upon the agreement of June 24th 
is decisive. Commercial Union Assocs. v. Clayton, 863 P.2d 29 (U. Apps. 1993); R.J. Daum Const. 
Co. v. Child, 247 P.2d 817, 819-20 (Utah 1952); Walters v. Natl Beverage Co., 402 P.2d 524, 525 
(Utah 1967). 
AMS WAS NEVER "FIRED" 
Central to the defense is the claim that on June 24, 2002, AMS was "fired" by 7-Eleven, 
leaving an empty, worthless shell for which Porters should not have to pay much. The claim has no 
substance. 
Porter concedes that on the morning of June 24, 2002, he and Cowley made a "buy-out 
agreement". It is admitted that on the afternoon of June 24, 2002, Cowley called Ann Atkin and was 
told that as 7-Eleven would not do business with a company associated with Cowley, Straight Line 
Striping ("SLS") could no longer work for 7-Eleven, and that Cowley conveyed this information to 
Porter (who had assured him to the contrary). As Cowley had told Atkin he would no longer be 
associated with AMS, Atkin did not tell Cowley that AMS could no longer work for 7-Eleven, and 
Cowley did not tell Porter. 
Mrs. Porter then called Atkin. Porter claims that she was told that no company associated 
with Mr. Cowley could thereafter work for 7-Eleven, and that, if the Porters wished to retain this 
work, they should promptly form a new company. Mrs. Porter told Mr. Porter. They promptly 
formed Quality Maintenance Systems, Inc. ("QMS") to carry on for AMS. Thus, according to Slone 
Porter, AMS was "fired" by 7-Eleven. In fact, since Cowley had agreed to leave AMS, all that 
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occurred is that Porters changed the company's name. Everything else remained the same. 
Since Cowley had already agreed to leave 7-Eleven, it is obvious that no real "firing" of AMS 
ever occurred. Porters would not have incorporated QMS had they believed 7-Eleven would not 
deal with AMS following Mr. Cowley's departure. What was said on the evening of June 24th 
provides no excuse for attempting to cancel the agreement reached the morning of June 24th. Further, 
Porters learned at the same time that any real decision about the future of the company first named 
AMS would not be made until June 27th, by Johan de Besche, not Ann Atkin. 
Nothing occurred on June 24th or June 27th which constituted the "firing" of AMS or its 
successor QMS, or which ultimately diminished in any way what Porters agreed to buy on June 24th. 
At most, on June 27, 2002, the basis on which QMS was paid for the work previously done for 7-
Eleven by AMS was temporarily changed. This admittedly was done while 7-Eleven investigated the 
involvement of the Porters in the defalcations of which they had accused Mr. Cowley. No such 
defalcations were ever found. As the Porters must have known at all times that their accusations of 
Cowley were false, they could never have been much concerned about the investigation. That 7-
Eleven required prior contracts to be re-bid in the Fall simply exercised a right which 7-Eleven had 
in any case. As discussed below, this could not have concerned the Porters either. 
PORTERS MAY NOT DEMAND A SIGNATURE THEY PREVENTED 
The Court's declaration at the end of trial that had the "buy-out" document signed by Slone 
Porter on June 24, 2002, then been signed by Tracy Cowley, the Court would enforce it without 
reservation, may place too great a stress on the necessity for Mr. Cowley's signature. 
It must be remembered that from June 24th onward, the Porters had the document. Mr. 
Cowley had indicated his willingness to sign when Mrs. Cowley returned, apparently on June 27lh. 
The notes of discussions June 27th with Mr. de Besche clearly affirm this, despite Porter's present 
denials. A phone call between Cowleys and Mrs. Porter on June 24th about the "no non-compete 
clause" changed nothing. The Porters could have obtained a signature at any time thereafter - but 
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Mr. Cowley could not affix one without the Porter's cooperation. By then, Porters had begun to 
imagine they could force a better deal. They never made the document available again. 
In the circumstances, the significance of a lack of Mr. Cowley's signature was not the ordinary 
one of lack of agreement. The signature became a mere formality prevented by the Porters. The 
Porters' behavior erases any meaning the failure of Mr. Cowley to affix a signature could have had. 
Where Cowley was not provided opportunity to sign, the Court should accord decisive 
significance to the fact that Mr. Cowley promptly, fully performed. There being no other means of 
signifying consent, the purport of full performance should not be diminished by failure to also affix 
a signature. 
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
The document signed by Slone Porter the morning of June 24, 2002, constituted Cowleys' 
counteroffer for the sale of Cowleys' half interest in AMS. Setting aside whether it was procured by 
duress, an acceptance which adds to or varies the terms constitutes a counteroffer. Cal Wadsworth 
Construction v. City of St. George, 898 P.2d 13 72,13 78 (Utah 1995). It is agreed that Cowley added 
terms to Porters' initial offer, and had Veralynn Porter type them for execution. It is also agreed that 
the parties were then informed and understood that the terms as typed were terms acceptable to 
Cowley. 
Porter's signature on a document constituting a written counteroffer created a contract. Id. 
While there is evidence of a brief discussion thereafter of changing a term sought by Cowley, the legal 
fact is that (excepting duress) Cowley was then bound. In any case, no change was made. The 
document as signed by Porter satisfies the Statute of Frauds. Commercial Union Assocs. v. Clayton, 
supra; LeVine v. Whitehouse, 109 Pac 2, 5-6 (Utah 1910). It could not thereafter be changed except 
by a further signed writing. S.CM. Land Co. v. Watkins &Faber, supra. 
Whatever technical defects might be alleged in this writing, the facts surrounding it are clear 
and convincing evidence of an agreement. All of the events of "performance" which transpired 
thereafter, including the $4,000/month payments after July 19, 2002, are referable to this agreement, 
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since there is no clear and convincing evidence of any other agreement. E.g., Martin v. Scholl, 678 
P.2d 274 (Utah 1983); Spears v. Warr, 44 P.3d. 743, 751 (Utah 2002); In re Roth's Estate, 269 P.2d 
278, 281 (Utah 1994). Having procured, by this agreement, full performance by the Cowleys, the 
Porters are not permitted to avoid their obligations by unilaterally asserting a subsequent, cheaper 
agreement. Commercial Union Assocs. v. Clayton, supra. The latter is precisely the kind of fraud the 
Statute of Frauds aims to prevent. 
In short, to the extent the Statute of Frauds is applicable in this case, it does not prevent 
enforcement of a $600,000 "buy-out" agreement, while excluding the Porters' claims of a $240,000 
agreement. 
"TOSSED IN THE JORDANELLE" 
The Porters concede that they tape recorded the meetings of the parties on June 22nd and June 
24, 2002. They concede that on June 24th, Tracy Cowley told them he accepted their original offer 
of June 22nd with some changes. They assert that Cowley then told them what changes he would 
accept. Cowley insisted upon a writing, which Slone Porter signed. 
Nevertheless, they say, on July 19, 2002, they reached a new agreement. Oddly, the Porters, 
though they say that the purpose of the meeting was to form a new agreement, did not record it. 
Cowley, who had insisted upon a writing before, is said to not have on July 19th. Then, says Mrs. 
Porter, on July 24th, at a Statehood Day celebration on the Jordanelle, she tossed in the tape 
recordings; they were no longer needed, in view of the oral agreement reached July 19th. Meanwhile, 
the Porters had the only copy of the June 24th document signed by Slone Porter. 
It seems plain that Mrs. Porter's story about July 24th was simply a lie to cover an 
embarrassment: she had already testified that she never complied with promises to provide the tapes 
to the Cowleys because the tapes had been destroyed before July 19, 2002. The purport of the story 
had it been true, however, cannot be ignored. Asserting the validity of an alleged "oral agreement" 
of which there was no undisputed proof, the Porters knowingly destroyed the undisputable evidence 
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of an earlier contrary oral agreement, while withholding a writing evidencing the earlier agreement. 
This behavior made it possible for defendants to claim, in a subsequent letter from their 
counsel to plaintiffs' counsel, that the alleged oral agreement to accept $240,000 for plaintiffs' half 
of AMS, had transpired on June 22, 2002. Plaintiffs, defendants and their counsel must have thought, 
had no undisputed proof of the real events of June 22-24, and if defendants got away with a claim of 
oral agreement on June 22, they could claim that everything that occurred thereafter was "part 
performance" under the Statute of Frauds of the alleged $240,000 agreement, while avoiding a claim 
that their behavior June 23-27 constituted coercion. 
Fortuitously, and unknown to defendants, when the letter to counsel was written, Mr. Cowley 
had retained the handwritten note of the agreement of June 24, 2002. While unsigned, the document 
rendered untenable the story told by Slone Porter in his first Affidavit, and prompted the convoluted 
tale told by the Porters in their Affidavits of September 29, 2003. 
ANNATKIN 
Defendants subpoenaed, to testify at trial, Ann Atkin of 7-Eleven, the author of at least two 
extraordinarily accusatory affidavits in this matter. Ms. Atkin reached the courthouse on June 2, 
2004, but was then sent home without testifying. 
No doubt, that was because Veralynn Porter had confessed on the stand that promptly upon 
Mr. Cowley's departure from AMS at the end of June 2002, the Porters, having re-incorporated AMS 
as QMS, began making payments to Ms. Atkin, Mr. Cowley's replacement at 7-Eleven. This was 
done by making Ms. Atkin's "life partner", Kim Ashton, and her company, Open to the Possibilities, 
a supplier to 7-Eleven through QMS.2 Mrs. Porter did not dispute that the sum of these payments 
through 2003 may have been $50,000, though she thought, without particulars, "that might be a little 
The possibility exists that Ms. Atkin was similarly paid between the time Mr. Cowley 
left 7-Eleven March 31, 2001 and June, 2002. By wrongfully withholding the password to the 
computer disk containing the AMS accounts, however, defendants have concealed this fact, and 
nothing about it can be claimed or shown. 
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high". Mr. de Besche who was Ms. Atkin's boss for at least several months after the payments 
began, testified that such an arrangement would have violated the 7-Eleven "Code of Business 
Conduct", and been "very wrong". Mr. de Besche said he was unaware of this behavior at the time. 
Plaintiffs discovered it only by examining the tardily produced accounts of QMS. 
Of course, Mrs. Porter confirmed what was shouted to her by counsel: that the payments to 
Atkin would not have been wrong if she had obtained permission from 7-Eleven. That, of course, 
is not evidence that Ms. Atkin had such permission (which must be in writing), and in any case, such 
permission, in the first instance, would have had to come from her boss, Mr. de Besche, who says he 
knew nothing of such payments. Certainly Mr. de Besche, in June 2002, having decided with respect 
to Mr. Cowley that 7-Eleven would not tolerate such behavior, would not have promptly authorized 
it in Ms. Atkin. 
Ms. Atkin did not appear because, short of asserting her rights under the Fifth Amendment, 
she would have had to confess away her job. 
The episode makes clear, however, at least the following: 
1. The Porters never had any principled objection to what they have vilified throughout as 
Mr. Cowley's misbehavior, and continued to engage in it with Ms. Atkin, while she and they 
denounced it to 7-Eleven and the Court in Mr. Cowley. 
2. Ms. Atkin's testimony by affidavit throughout this proceeding was compensated by the 
Porters, without disclosure to plaintiffs or the Court. 
3. The Porters' relationship with Ms. Atkin may be the ground for the alleged recent dismissal 
of QMS by 7-Eleven, which the Porters have attempted to blame on Mr. Cowley in an effort to avoid 
further obligation under even the contract they assert as a defense. 
4. The central allegation of the defense - that the business for which Porters on June 22 and 
24, 2002, agreed to pay $600,000, was vastly reduced in value by disclosure to Ann Atkin on June 
23rd and 27th, 2002, of behavior she fundamentally disapproved, rendering doubtful the future of 7-
Eleven contracts to be "re-bid" thereafter - was knowingly false throughout. Atkin could not have 
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disapproved behavior in which she promptly engaged, further, as Mr Cowley testified without 
contradiction, as successor to Mr. Cowley's position, Atkm controlled the re-bidding process With 
Atkin on its payroll, QMS was certain to get the contracts back 
5 The Porters' assertion made to obtain the $240,000 agreement they claim was made July 
19, 2002 - that QMS could afford no more than $4,000/month for five years - and any contract 
resulting from it, was fraudulent The income inherited by QMS from AMS was then as secure as 
it had ever been 
The miserable tale of Ann Atkin, as much as the Porters' tawdry fabrications about drowned 
tape recordings, demonstrates that the defense in this case has been in wholesale bad faith from the 
outset 
DURESS 
Defendants literally claim that the alleged $240,000 contract to purchase plaintiffs' half of 
AMS was procured by duress. 
The Court has held that defendants violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing among 
partners to gain advantage over plaintiffs by "confessing" alleged improprieties to 7-Eleven 
Defendants assert that they then unilaterally reduced the amount due plaintiffs under "our buy-out 
agreement" reached previously, upon the threat that, unless plaintiffs agreed, "no one would get 
paid " Defendants knew that the threat was false, but did not inform plaintiffs 
any wrongful act or threat, which actually puts the victim in such fear as to 
compel him to act against his will constitutes duress 
Heglar Ranch, Inc. v. Stillman, 619 P 2d 1390, 1391 (Utah 1980) 
Tracy Cowley's uncontradicted testimony was that Slone Porter threatened the Cowleys that 
if they did not accept the Porters' terms, Porters could have 7-Eleven sue the Cowleys 
Plaintiffs deny that they acceded to defendants' bullying, fraud and threats Supposing, 
however, that defendants' story was deemed credible, it is plain that any agreement obtained was 
procured by duress and unenforceable Bond v. SDNCO, Inc , 54 P 3d 1131, 1137-1138 (Utah 
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2002); Strickland Tower Maintenance, Inc. v.AT& T Communications, Inc., 128 F. 3d 1422 (10 Cir. 
1997). 
As the Court has already held, defendants' behavior was wrongful, it violated a duty of good 
faith and fair dealing. It was deceptive and fraudulent in failing to disclose Porters' control of Atkin. 
It was coercive and threatening, because it asserted that Porters' improperly obtained leverage could 
result in Cowleys' receiving nothing or being sued. If Cowleys agreed, Porters concede that it was 
against their will, insofar as Slone Porter testifies that the Cowleys first "exploded". There could 
hardly be a clearer case of duress and unenforceability. 
RESCISSION 
Plaintiffs believe that on June 24, 2002, they entered into an agreement to sell their half of 
AMS to defendants for $600,000 payable over five years. Had that agreement been honestly 
performed, plaintiffs would have accepted the payments, though they believe that the price was unfair. 
Instead, they have been faced with outright breach of the agreement and denial of its existence, then 
with a campaign of attrition, in the hope that refusal to concede the truth would produce sufficient 
delay that the pittance defendants have paid (while munificently aggrandizing themselves) would 
eventually starve any action against them. 
As a general proposition, a party to a contract has a right of rescission and an 
action for restitution as an alternative to an action for damages where there has been 
a material breach of the contract by the other party. What constitutes so serious a 
breach as to justify rescission is not easily reduced to precise statement, but certainly 
a failure of performance which "defeats the very object of the contract" or "[is] of 
such prime importance that the contract would not have been made if default in that 
particular had been contemplated" is a material failure. 
Polyglycoat Corp-, v. Holcomb, 591 P.2d 449, 451 (Utah 1979) (citations omitted). 
There can be no question that defendants' refusal to pay the price agreed was a material 
breach, or that once the breach occurred, compliance was demanded and refused. Plaintiffs are 
entitled to rescission. 
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RELIEF 
Defendants are simply thieves and liars Except with plaintiffs' consent, they are not entitled 
to acquire, for $600,000 without interest, in monthly installments for five years, an interest which 
their own income demonstrates was worth vastly more 
The latter suggests a difficulty in formulating relief in this case Defendants have always 
thought that so long as they could limit what plaintiffs received, they could stifle litigation against 
them, and make themselves judgment proof They think so now they now claim a right to stop 
paying defendants altogether, even on the $240,000 contract they assert The weapon of bad faith 
and non-compliance should be taken out of defendants' hands at once 
The best that defendants could do in this case was to limit what they owe to $240,000 Their 
prospects in this regard were always virtually zero They may get by for $600,000, but proof of a 
$600,000 agreement leads directly to a claim for rescission, as well as to a claim for bad faith defense, 
and fees and costs under § 78-27-56, U C A (1953) It is possible that a valuation in a judicial 
dissolution will show a value for plaintiffs' half interest as of June 22, 2002, of less than $600,000, 
but it is extremely unlikely Within these parameters and unless plaintiffs now opt to re-affirm the 
$600,000 agreement, the Court should fashion a remedy which cancels the advantages defendants 
have arrogated to themselves 
Defendants have paid plaintiffs $88,000 at $4,000/month Certainly, they must continue to 
pay at least $4,000/month This amount is $6,000/month short of the $600,000 buy-out, creating a 
present shortage of $132,000, even if the $600,000 buy-out were enforced If the latter sum were 
ordered paid at once, the sum paid would not exceed the at least $240,000 admittedly owed 
defendants would still owe five months at $4,000 Five months should suffice to complete a 
valuation, whereupon a new order can be made for satisfaction of the debt This result could not 
seriously discomfit defendants, even in the extraordinary unlikelihood of a successful appeal A 
further order for fees against defendants would be fully justified now, and might serve to caution 
defendants against further delay 
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Such an order - or a more generous one within the Court's discretion - is essential to prevent 
defendants stifling the exercise of rights against them by determined misbehavior. The Court should 
order that as prompt a hearing as possible be had to determine the value of a half interest in AMS as 
of June 22, 2002, and that in the interim defendants promptly pay to plaintiffs at least the sum of 
$132,000, while continuing to make monthly payments of $4,000/month. Such sums may be 
appropriately deducted from the final award. 
FEES 
Section 78-27-56, U.C.A. (1953) provides: 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a 
prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense to the action was 
without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith, except under Subsection (2). 
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a 
party under Subsection (1), but only if the court: 
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity in the action 
before the court; or 
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees 
under the provisions of Subsection (1). 
The Court has correctly found that, in attempting to expose plaintiffs to the anger of 7-Eleven 
in order to force an acquisition of AMS on defendants' terms, defendants breached a covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing between partners. In fact, defendants' behavior has been coercive and 
deceitful throughout, entitling plaintiffs to their attorneys' fees under § 78-27-56. 
The entirety of the defense in this case has been that, since AMS lost all its value on June 24, 
2002, except the value of its "hard assets", the parties on July 19, 2002, made an agreement to sell 
plaintiffs' half of AMS for $240,000, whereupon Slone Porter filed an Affidavit of Dissolution for 
AMS, a corporation without stock or stockholders. Between June 22, 2002 and July 19, 2002, 
defendants claimed, plaintiffs refused to agree to a $600,000 buy-out. Defendants and their counsel 
have known at all pertinent times that the claim of such an agreement was not only false, but that its 
enforcement was impossible. 
Defendants now admit that on June 24, 2002, the parties at least orally agreed upon a 
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$600,000 "buy-out", the terms of which are written and signed by Slone Porter. Tracy Cowley then 
withheld signature of the document for a couple of days, but the reason was not rejection of the 
terms, and the signature could have been obtained readily thereafter except that defendants, who had 
the document, did not submit it for signature. 
What happened in the interim to prevent it was that defendants believed they had obtained 
leverage from 7-Eleven to coerce a cheaper deal. They excuse this upon the ground that "AMS has 
been fired" by 7-Eleven. "Fired", however, is simply manipulative jargon to disguise the fact that 7-
Eleven had allowed defendants to continue the work of AMS for 7-Eleven, so long as they "re-
incorporated" as QMS following Mr. Cowley's agreement to leave. The new arrangement with 7-
Eleven on June 27th did not change in the least degree the benefits to defendants of their June 24th 
bargain with plaintiffs. This is particularly true in light of the undisclosed fact that defendants had 
then subverted Mr. Cowley's replacement at 7-Eleven, Ann Atkin, and shortly began making 
payments to her through her family to assure that she controlled any 7-Eleven re-bidding process to 
favor QMS. 
On July 19th, defendants attempted to force plaintiffs to accept half the value of an informal 
and incomplete appraisal of "hard assets" of AMS, less half the debt attached to equipment being kept 
by Porters. When this attempt failed, defendants offered $4,000/month for five years, as representing 
what QMS "could afford". Defendants cannot explain the change of position. 
Both parties then knew, however, that what QMS could afford would shortly be clarified, by 
re-bidding of the 7-Eleven contracts and likely substantially increased. The $4,000/month figure was 
temporary, subject to clarification. There is simply no reason why the parties would have based a 
permanent agreement on a temporary figure, and no evidence that they did, except the word of Slone 
Porter disputed by Tracy Cowley. There is no writing. 
Even if there had been credible evidence of a long term agreement to accept $4,000/month, 
Slone Porter admits that it was procured by the false representation that otherwise Cowleys might 
get nothing, and no one denies that Porter threatened Cowley with legal action by 7-Eleven if he 
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didn't accede. 
Porters have known from the outset that their claims of a permanent $4,000/month agreement 
reached July 19, 2002, were false. Their counsel knew, and were required to advise them, that any 
claimed oral agreement was vitiated by fraud and duress, and further, could not conceivably satisfy 
the rules of partial performance under the Statute of Frauds. The existence of a prior agreement, 
which would have to be admitted, rendered impossible any claim of performance "strictly referable" 
to an unprovable, subsequent "agreement". 
Defendants have always known that their defense could not survive the briefest examination. 
They have withheld information (see Affidavit of Slone Porter Sept. 29, 2003), withheld discovery 
(such as the passwords to computer disks produced tardily), destroyed evidence to head off 
litigation, purchased the testimony of Ann Atkin, and lied (what else can be said, for example, of Mrs. 
Porter's claim to have destroyed tape recordings on July 24, 2002, despite her prior admission that 
they were destroyed before July 19th?). They knew they could only delay a day of reckoning by 
withholding and obscuring the truth. 
Through all of this, they used the Cowley's half of AMS to pay themselves twice what they 
had ever earned before, while ceding the Cowleys less than half They left no stone unturned to 
prolong this state of affairs, hoping that a war of attrition would succeed in avoiding liability. 
Defendants have shattered the good faith requirement of § 78-27-56. They must be required 
to pay plaintiffs' attorney fees. 
VERALYNN PORTER IS A PROPER DEFENDANT 
Plaintiffs respectfully assert that the Court has improvidently dismissed Veralynn Porter as 
a defendant in this matter. While it is true that Mrs. Porter did not own stock in AMS, and would 
not on that account have been a proper party plaintiff, she was clearly a proper party defendant. 
It is also true that only Slone Porter signed the "Buy-Out Agreement" for Cowleys' half of 
AMS. The evidence indicates, however, that the intent was that the two Porters take over the 
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company, and pay for it. It is evidence of this intent that the negotiations to purchase were 
dominated, on the part of the Porters, by Veralynn and that the vehicle into which Porters attempted 
to transfer AMS, QMS, was owned fifty percent by Veralynn Porter. 
Further, unless the Court orders specific performance of the signed "Buy-Out Agreement", 
it is plain that the liability to pay Cowleys attaches to both the Porters. 
To the extent that AMS remains undissolved, QMS is simply an empty corporate shell into 
which the Porters attempted, unsuccessfully, to transfer AMS, and in which they improperly received 
income of AMS. Absent an enforceable dissolution of AMS, QMS, is irrelevant. 
There is literally no evidence that the Cowleys ever dealt with QMS. In making a bargain to 
sell a share of AMS for $600,000 on June 24, 2002, Cowley dealt with the Porters. QMS did not 
then exist. If that bargain fails for any reason, there exists no subsequent agreement. Any alleged 
negotiations for a further agreement on July 19, 2002, in any case, were with Slone and Veralynn 
Porter. Porters did not purport to act for QMS, but to finalize an agreement reached before there 
was a QMS. While checks paying the Cowleys $4,000/month beginning August 2002, were drawn 
on a QMS account (to SLS), the name on the account is irrelevant. 
Cowleys having dealt only with the Porters, there is no need to question the status of QMS, 
or to "pierce the corporate veil". It is fundamentally irrelevant into what form of entity the Porters 
attempted to transfer what they purchased from the Cowleys. The purchase and dissolution of the 
former entity had to occur before any such transfer. 
On the other hand, it is plain that Veralynn Porter participated throughout in efforts to coerce 
Cowleys to sell, and to deceive them about the circumstances in which Porters embroiled them. Mrs. 
Porter first contacted Ann Atkin and met with her. Though Mrs. Cowley did not, Mrs. Porter met 
with Johan de Besche, and by her own testimony, begged that "we" be permitted to continue the 
work of AMS, and that 7-Eleven continue with "us" the relationship it had with AMS. It is with this 
plea that de Besche agreed for 7-Eleven. 
It was Mrs. Porter who destroyed the evidence. 
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Plainly, Mrs. Porter acted in these matters on her own account, not as an employee or 
assistant of Mr. Porter, and with the intent of receiving half the spoils for herself She admittedly did 
receive and use half the spoils. 
Those who participated directly in, and benefitted directly from, the wrongful dispossession 
of a business, are proper defendants in an action to recoup the value of the business taken. Veralynn 
Porter is a proper defendant in this action. The Court should vacate its ruling dismissing her. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 17th day of June, 2004. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 17th day of June, 2004, I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing "PLAINTIFFS' POST TRIAL MEMO" to be mailed by U.S. mail, first-class postage 
prepaid, to: 
Jeffrey R.Price (6315) 
Christopher C. Hill (9583) 
BOSTWICK & PRICE, P.C. 
139 E. South Temple, #320 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
ph:(801)961-7400 
E. Craig Smay 
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